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The Christmas visit of Egypt’s interim president Adly
Mansour to the Coptic Cathedral in Cairo occasioned
much commentary in the Egyptian press about a new
era in church-state relations. Indeed, newspaper
headlines heralded the visit as the first undertaken by
an Egyptian president to a Coptic patriarch to offer
congratulations on a Coptic holiday. The interim
president’s magnanimity in making the visit was set in stark contrast to the parsimonious
attitude of Hosni Mubarak, who would typically leave such obligatory greetings to a lesser figure
in the Egyptian government. Set alongside the symbolism of the Christmas visit were
statements made by several governors and Ministry of Interior officials to the effect that Coptic
churches would enjoy heightened protection throughout the holiday period.
In the wake of the Mohamed Morsi presidency, characterized by the trauma of the April 7, 2013
assault on the Coptic Cathedral compound in the Cairo district of Abbasiya, the visit of the
interim president and the assurances of security officials were of great significance. Since
Morsi’s July 3, 2013 ouster, Egypt’s rulers have repeatedly promised Copts a reprieve from the
uncertainty and violence that has plagued their community almost continuously since New
Year’s Day 2011, when Alexandria’s Church of the Two Saints was bombed. Those heralding a
new era in church-state relations point in particular to the new Egyptian constitution that was
recently passed in a referendum. The charter includes the provision that church renovation and
construction will no longer require the express permission of the Egyptian head of state—a
requirement that for decades occasioned conflict and consternation among both Egyptian
Christians and Muslims.
There can be little question that, set in the narrow context of Egypt’s “transitional” period since
the 2011 revolution, these steps represent significant and meaningful change. But in the
broader context of Egypt’s modern history, one cannot speak quite so blithely of a new era in
church-state relations. Indeed, I would suggest that the interim president’s visit to the cathedral
and the accompanying government moves represent mere reinvigoration of a pattern in
church-state relations that has prevailed since the 1960s—a pattern that I have dubbed the
“millet partnership.”[1]
Prior to Mansour’s recent visit to the Coptic cathedral, the most significant such visit undertaken
by an Egyptian head of state was that of Gamal Abdel Nasser on June 25, 1968, when Saint
Mark’s Cathedral was consecrated. In an image that is featured prominently on postcards and
posters in Coptic churches throughout Egypt, Nasser joined hands with then Patriarch Kyrillos
VI on the occasion of the consecration. Yet Nasser and Kyrillos were consecrating not only the
cathedral, but a partnership between the Egyptian state and the Coptic Orthodox Church. This
partnership would involve state acknowledgment of the patriarch as the chief spiritual and
temporal representative of the Coptic community, in exchange for steadfast church support for
state policies.
Although Mubarak may well have struck Copts as stingy in his respect for Coptic holidays, this
partnership between the Egyptian state and the Coptic Orthodox Church facilitated a vast
expansion of church activity, notably in social services, from the late 1980s through the 2000s.
For Pope Shenouda, under whose stewardship this expansion took place, the rise of church
institutions permitted him to influence far greater numbers of Coptic Christians than his
predecessors had. For Mubarak, the partnership with Shenouda was a vital means by which to
co-opt the Coptic community—to ensure Coptic political quiescence.
Of course, this quiescence was shattered in the wake of the 2011 New Year’s bombing, when
Copts took to the streets in unprecedented fashion to condemn the state’s disregard for their
security. The protesters were sending a message not only to the Egyptian state and to Muslims,
but to their Church leadership as well.  To demonstrate in that way was an act of defiance
against the Church, specifically against the Church hierarchy’s partnership with an authoritarian
state. Indeed, Shenouda’s partnership with Mubarak meant that there existed no secular
leadership of the Coptic community untainted by complicity with the government—no
independent voice willing and able to voice Copts’ grievances. To venture into the streets
without Shenouda’s blessing was to question his partnership with Mubarak and to give voice to
a political vision independent of that of the Patriarch.
These protests were among the most important precursors to Egypt’s 2011 revolution, during
which Copts and Muslims came together to demand Mubarak’s ouster. However, with the rise
of Morsi as president, those Copts who had supported the 2011 revolution gradually saw their
hopes betrayed. The self-proclaimed “president for all Egyptians” not only failed to appoint the
Coptic vice president he had promised, but went on to disregard all voices of dissent during a
time when Egypt’s “democratic transition” was extraordinarily fragile. The church-state
partnership that Nasser and Kyrillos had fostered in the 1960s was effectively reduced to
tatters, particularly when prominent members of the president’s Muslim Brotherhood
organization engaged in explicitly anti-Coptic incitement during public rallies.
This is the context within which one must understand the support of the current pope—Pope
Tawadros—for the current military-backed order. Regrettably, the Morsi presidency’s continuous
emphasis on the “rule of the majority” practically obliterated whatever faith Copts had in the
pluralist potential of the 2011 revolution. As a result, the Coptic community has come to
endorse the status quo ante of the millet partnership—this time between Tawadros and General
Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi.
There is, of course, much that is tragic about Egypt’s current predicament – about the stark
contrast between the high hopes of 2011 and the disillusionment of 2013-14. But there is a
particular sense of tragedy associated with the Coptic community’s experience of the Egyptian
revolution and its aftermath. Arguably, the 2011 revolution held the promise of a transformation
not only in the Egyptian state, but in the Coptic Orthodox Church as well—a church that has
grown apace in recent decades, but that has nonetheless tended to mirror the authoritarianism
of the state. For those Copts who had the courage to call for change in both their church and
their state back in 2011, today’s return to the millet partnership must seem doubly tragic.
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